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Abstract!
This paper addresses the core notions of the Resource Based View, that rarity provides superior 
performance. We examine the limits of rarity as a driver of performance in the process of innovation. 
We also claim that uncertainty affects this process, both directly and moderating the effect of rarity. 
Using patent data relative to hydrocracking – a mature technology experiencing periods of stable and 
unpredictable development – we find that rarity has a U-shaped effect on innovation value, as both rare 
and non-rare inventions are valuable. Uncertainty has an inverted U-shaped effect on innovation value, 
as in conditions of low uncertainty incremental innovation tends to prevail, while high uncertainty 
leads to imitation of successful practices. Low, but not high, uncertainty moderates the relationship 
between rarity and innovation value. 
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Introduction!
A vibrant scholarly debate has emphasized the challenges in using the Resource Based View 
(Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991) as a theoretical approach in strategic management research (Priem and 
Butler 2001a; Priem and Butler 2001b; Hoopes, Madsen et al. 2003; Lockett, Thompson et al. 2009; 
Kraaijenbrink, Spender et al. 2010; Wernerfelt 2013) focusing, in particular, on the shortcomings of the 
concept of competitive advantage (Powell 2001); on the indeterminateness of the notion of value and 
resource (Priem and Butler 2001a; Priem and Butler 2001b); and on the fact the applicability of theory 
is too limited (Miller 2003; Gibbert 2006; Levitas and Ndofor 2006). Recently, one of the core 
concepts of the Resource Based View, namely the notion that rarity of a resource or a capability 
contributes to a firm’s performance, has been questioned and, for the first times, empirically tested. It 
has been pointed out that firms benefit from rare combinations – rather than rare individual resources 
and capabilities (Kor and Leblebici 2005; Teece 2007; Newbert 2008), and that rarity of dynamic, but 
not ordinary capabilities matters for firm performance (Drnevich and Kriauciunas 2011). These 
contributions emphasize the need for a better conceptualization as well as for systematic empirical 
evidence of the theorized propositions of the Resource Based View. 
We take part in this debate by investigating under what conditions rare and non-rare capabilities 
contribute to firm performance. In line with Drnevich and Kriauciunas (2011), we qualify a capability 
as “rare” when it is developed and used only by one or few firms in an industry. Furthermore, we 
analyze the role of uncertainty as a main moderating factor in regards to the value captured from either 
rare or non-rare capabilities. Uncertainty has been highlighted as an important theoretical concept in 
the Resource Based framework (Foss and Knudsen 2003), but our knowledge of its impact is still 
limited (eg. Schmidt and Keil 2013). 
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In this paper, we deepen our understanding of the concept of resource value by examining a crucial 
function for sustainable competitive advantage: innovation management. We explore the relationship 
among the value of an invention, the rarity of the technological capabilities upon which they build and 
the uncertainty surrounding that technology. It is well known that not all inventions are patented, and a 
single invention may give rise to several patents dealing with each of its components (Arundel and 
Kabla 1998; Jaffe 2000; Zeebroeck 2011). Anyhow, patents are important assets of firms and they play 
a central role in technology management, and scholars and practitioners are increasing interested in 
measuring their value (Ernst 2003; Gambardella 2013). 
A patent is at the same time an asset for a firm, and an expression of its technological capabilities 
(Trajtenberg 1990). Within the theoretical framework offered by the Resource Based View (eg. 
Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991) it has been proposed that firms not only acquire, but also develop 
resources internally (Dierickx and Cool 1989): it is then possible to argue that firms that develop 
unique technological capabilities and protect them by means of a patent – a legal tool that protect them 
from imitation – may achieve a competitive advantage. This theoretical approach suggests an 
association between the rarity of a technological capability and the contribution to performance of the 
patented invention that exploits that capability. However, we argue that not only rare technological 
capabilities for innovations are valuable and may be a source of competitive advantage: innovations 
that are highly related to other complementary innovations are likely to build on non-rare technological 
capabilities, why non-rare capabilities also become valuable. 
Our study moves one step further, suggesting that the value of a technological capability is not fully 
explained by its rarity (or non-rarity), but is contingent on the uncertainty of the technological 
environment. The uncertainty characterizing a technology or a set of interrelated technologies depends 
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on the dynamics of demand (Fontana and Guerzoni 2008), the stage of development of a technology 
and the existence of competing technologies (Ragatz, Handfield et al. 2002). Uncertainty tends to 
increase the value of more non-rare technologies, particularly as uncertainty increases with 
technological complexity (Tushman and Rosenkopf 1992). In fact, an uncertainty increases transactions 
costs that ultimately increases operational costs (Artz and Brush 2000). 
We suggest that companies achieve a competitive advantage when they develop technological 
capabilities that are consistent with the degree of technological uncertainty of the environment in which 
they compete. We take the empirical case of hydrocracking to explore these issues. Hydrocracking is a 
mature technology widely used as a part of the oil refinery process to transform crude oil into high 
value petroleum products. Innovations in hydrocracking are based on both rare and non-rare 
combinations of technological capabilities, making it an ideal setting to explore the effects of 
technological rarity. Furthermore, the degree of uncertainty surrounding this technology fluctuated, in 
particular after 1970.  
The findings of our study show that, consistently with expectations, both rare and non-rare 
technological capabilities result in above normal returns in terms of patent value; and that the 
relationship between uncertainty and value is inverted U-shaped. The benefits from increasing 
uncertainty are subject to negative returns, indicating that there is a point where higher levels of 
uncertainty become unfavorable. Finally we find that low uncertainty has a negative moderating effect 
on the effect of rarity on patent value. 
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the academic standing of the Resource Based View, 
providing an empirical test of its core propositions that better specifies to what extent of rare resources 
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and capabilities contribute to competitive advantage; furthermore, it addresses a central issue in 
Management of Innovation, i.e. generation of inventions, providing insights on the internal and external 
conditions that support the invention process. These results provide managers with precious 
information about how to effectively organize Research & Development (R&D) activities, as they 
characterize the features of the capabilities and of the environment that drive innovation value. 
The remains of this paper is structured as follows; first we introduce key theoretical concepts and build 
our hypotheses, this is followed by an overview of the data and methodology applied, presentation of 
our empirical findings and rounding up with a discussion of the results. 
Effects!of!rarity!and!uncertainty!on!individual!innovations!value!
Rarity!of!competencies!and!value!of!innovations!!
The Resource-Based View (Penrose 1959; Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991; Teece, Pisano et al. 1997) 
(Hamel and Prahalad 1993; Teece, Rumelt et al. 1994) has affirmed itself as one of the leading 
theoretical frameworks in Strategic Management (Rouse and Daellenbach 2002; Newbert 2008); 
providing a powerful framework to relate the process of accumulation of technological capabilities to 
the value of a technological innovation. This theoretical approach argues that a sustainable competitive 
advantage is conveyed by bundles of valuable, rare, inimitable, and/or non-substitutable resources and 
capabilities. If a resource or competence yields the potential to enable a firm to reduce costs and/or 
respond to environmental opportunities and threats, it is valuable, and to the extent that a firm is able to 
effectively deploy such a resource or capability, it will attain a competitive advantage (Barney 1991). 
According to this perspective, patents can be considered as competitive advantage-enabling asset, as 
they protect inventions from imitation. The resource-based perspective thus helps our understanding of 
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how the internal environment of the firm affects the process of innovation, and of how the value of 
resources and competencies is associated to the fact of being ‘rare’. 
The idea that invention is the result of a process of recombination of knowledge about the components 
of a product or the reconfiguration of their architecture is well established in the literature on 
management of technology (Henderson and Clark 1990; Fleming and Sorenson 2004). Experience in 
deepening the knowledge of a specific technological component refers to the technological capability 
of a firm, which is distinct from the architectural capability consisting in combining different 
technology areas. Improvements of the knowledge of the components, as well as their original 
recombination are sources of technological innovation (Makri, Hitt et al. 2010). 
It has been argued that the rarity of a combination of capabilities related to a specific functional area is 
a driver of competitive advantage (Newbert 2008), and studies on technological capabilities have 
shown that their rarity is associated to with being able to produce innovations that are rare to the market 
(Danneels 2002; Miller 2003; Danneels 2007). 
However, also non-rare capabilities contribute to competitive advantage. It is the case of the 
capabilities that all firms in an industry should possess in order to compete effectively (Winter 2003) or 
those that represent an effective way to deal with common technical problems, and for this reason they 
are adopted quite homogeneously by firms in an industry (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). Broad 
diffusion of a capability generates a shared knowledge base that firms in an industry can exploit by 
means of imitation and incremental development with an external-learning advantage, as existence of a 
shared pool of knowledge they can reduce the costs related to the use of a capability by means of 
imitation and incremental development (Aghion and Howitt 1998). Under such conditions, the cost of 
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using a common resource is lower than that necessary to develop a unique resource or capability 
internally (Greve 2009; Drnevich and Kriauciunas 2011). 
With specific regard to management of innovation, non-rare capabilities provide two additional sources 
of value. First, a rare capability indicates a discontinuity with the existing technological base of an 
industry. This may be a source of competitive advantage, but, at the same time, reliance on rare 
technological capabilities limits the possibilities for a firm to exploit the advantages of complementary 
technologies thus limiting the strategic options for the innovating firm; on the other hand, a non-rare 
capability may fit better with the existing capability base of an innovating firm, thus carrying more 
value than a rare one (Butler 1988; Makri, Hitt et al. 2010; Wu, Wan et al. 2013). Second, the learning 
literature emphasizes that deepening the knowledge of non-rare technologies activates learning 
processes so that such knowledge reaches the level to be a strategic resource (Argote 1993; Levinthal 
and Wu 2010). 
For these reasons, the ability to generate valuable innovations may be provided to the firm by either 
developing technological competencies that are widespread in the industry and have a broader scope of 
application, or creating rare technological competencies that may sustain the generation of 
discontinuous innovations. We consider less rewarding for innovation an “intermediate” strategy, 
consisting in developing capabilities that are neither rare nor non-rare. 
For this reason we expect  
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between the value of an innovation and rarity is curvilinear and takes 
an U-shape. 
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Uncertainty!and!innovations!value!
Environmental dynamics affect a firm’s competence base, as they determine the possibility of a 
competence to be deployed for generating innovation. Notably, substantial changes in the technological 
environment may make a competence obsolete, eroding its value (Danneels 2002). While rare 
technological capabilities can generate discontinuous innovations, and thus they are valuable assets for 
a firm, they tend to be associated with a higher degree of environmental uncertainty than non-rare 
technological capabilities (Fleming 2001). The process of innovation is influenced by uncertainty and 
serendipity, so that firms cannot predict whether their R&D effort will be successful in terms of 
generating an innovation, or successful in terms of the most efficient strategy to address a research 
puzzle (Ahuja, Lampert et al. 2008), and the investment in complementary resources needed to bring an 
invention to commercialization (Reitzig 2006). Furthermore, it is well known that the degree of 
uncertainty surrounding a given technology varies across the various stages of its development 
(Anderson and Tushman 1990). Environmental uncertainty refers to the predictability of the demand 
for the final and intermediate goods the technology will be incorporated (Sorenson 2000), as well as the 
pattern of development of technology and the resources required for its elaboration (Makadok and 
Barney 2001) and the combined effect of market and technology forces (Souder, Sherman et al. 1998). 
When a firm can easily predict the development of technologies and markets, decision-making and 
organization of R&D are relatively simple, as the interpretation of consumers’ preferences and 
competitors’ moves requires a much simpler computational effort. A clear picture of the environmental 
dynamics permits a firm to focus its R&D efforts in the development of the technological capabilities 
that are likely to drive to a competitive advantage.  
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However, in conditions of low environmental uncertainty there is less room for differentiation since all 
firms have shared expectations of technological dynamics. Furthermore, low uncertainty environments 
can be dominated by incremental, technical change, whereby the opportunity for radical innovation is 
low (Tushman and Rosenkopf 1992). 
In conditions of high environmental uncertainty, firms establish more sophisticated R&D 
organizations, with stronger inter-functional integration (Artz and Brush 2000). This allows firms to 
experiment novel approaches to R&D, either increasing or reducing their investment and commitment 
to a specific technology trajectory. In conditions in which it is difficult to assess the relative value of 
different technological combinations (Ragatz, Handfield et al. 2002), firms tend not to follow 
optimization criteria to define their R&D strategy, but rather base their decision-making on heuristics 
(Bingham, Eisenhardt et al. 2007; Bingham and Haleblian 2012). In an uncertain environment firms 
tend to imitate innovative decision as well as decision-making processes from successful firms, so that 
innovation models diffuse fast in the industry (Dimaggio and Powell 1983; Davis 1991; Westphal, 
Seidel et al. 2001; Ahuja, Lampert et al. 2008). 
These two opposite forces suggest that an optimal environment for creating valuable innovations is 
located between high and low environmental uncertainty. 
For this reason we expect  
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between the value of an innovation and environmental uncertainty is 
curvilinear and takes an inverted U-shape. 
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This paper aims to shed new light on the effect of environmental uncertainty on the relationship 
between the rarity of the technological capabilities on which an innovation builds on, and its value.  We 
expect that the possibility for a firm to extract a valuable innovation out of either a rare or non-rare 
combination of technological capabilities is contingent to the uncertainty characterizing the pattern of 
evolution of the technology. 
In conditions of high uncertainty, irreversible investments in the development of technological 
capabilities present a high opportunity cost. In fact, an investment in capabilities that are functional to 
pursue a given technological trajectory may lose its value if the industry shifts on an alternative 
technological trajectory. For this reason, firms evaluate their commitment to a specific technological 
pattern comparing alternative options; this may lead firms to delay their investment decision as well as 
to invest in capabilities that can be exploited in different technological domains (McGrath 1997; 
Leiblein 2003). In these environmental conditions, firms developing non-rare technological capabilities 
seem to have an advantage in adapting to alternative future scenarios, as long as these capabilities 
entail a higher degree of generality. However, these environmental conditions strengthen also the value 
of more rare capabilities: in fact, the future development of the technologies can make intensive use of 
a specific combination of technological competencies, which thus increase their relative value vis-à-vis 
alternative combinations of competencies. The actual value of competencies under high uncertainty is 
difficult to predict; however, it is possible to argue that rare competencies benefit from increases in 
uncertainty. 
By contrast, under conditions of low uncertainty, innovation tends to be incremental along the 
dominant trajectory (Utterback and Abernathy 1975; Levinthal and Wu 2010). A clear competitive and 
technological map of the demand reduces the risks associated with the development of unique 
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capabilities (Sorenson 2000) as well as the investment in non-rare capabilities. In these conditions, a 
broader range of technological capabilities becomes useful to generate innovations – not only those at 
the extremes of the distribution, i.e. those that are extremely unique or widespread in the industry. 
For this reason we expect 
Hypothesis 3a: The relationship between the value of an innovation and rarity is moderated by high 
uncertainty in such a way that the U-shape relationship is sharpened. 
Hypothesis 3b: The relationship between the value of an innovation and rarity is moderated by low 
uncertainty in such a way that the U-shape relationship is flattened. 
Data!and!Variables!
This study draws upon a unique dataset consisting of all the patent applications within the 
Hydrocracking technology to explore the hypotheses presented above. We classify the patent 
applications in our dataset into the distinct technology areas present in the hydrocracking on the level 
of each innovation, using these as a representation of the applied research outcomes within the industry 
(Meyer 2000). Combinations of these classifications are used to indicate whether an innovation builds 
upon a combination of more than one technology area, hereby we can identify how rare a certain type 
of technological combination underlying an innovation is, at any point in time, within the industry.  
The use of patent data to explore technology combinations has predominantly relied on the use of the 
international patent classification (IPC) codes to identify the technological scope of a patent, though 
prior studies have experienced some discrepancy in the measure (Lerner 1994; Harhoff, Scherer et al. 
2003). This is caused in part by the IPC as patents are assigned codes by the individual patent 
examiner, and while the individual patent office follow a coherent classification scheme; regional 
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differences have a significant impact on how a patent is classified (Harhoff, Scherer et al. 2003). This is 
supported by a prior study finding only a weak correlation between Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) and IPC codes, in addition to some technology areas being covered by different sections of the 
IPC (Cohen, Nelson et al. 2002). These issues become further apparent when taking into account that a 
single patent can be classified by multiple IPC codes, where a weak relation was found between IPC 
codes at the three- and four-digit level (Leydesdorff 2008). Therefore, in an effort to counter these 
issues, we offer an alternative to counting IPC classes to determine the technological scope of a patent. 
This is achieved through a novel approach where IPC codes are grouped according to their 
technological application through a qualitative process with the aid of a technical expert within the 
field. Through this process we identify three distinct technology areas, each associated with a group of 
IPC codes relevant to each distinct technology area. Each patent application in our sample is classified 
according to one or more of these technology areas. This process highlighted the deficiency of using 
IPC codes as an indicator of technological proximity due to IPC codes similar in the classification 
scheme can prove to be covering an alternative application or competing technology. Such issues are 
difficult to identify through quantitative methods, as to very different IPC codes often share the first 
seven of the nine digits in the IPC, making it difficult to positively identify technological proximity 
without the means of expert advice. 
Hydrocracking is a technology covering the later stages of the oil refining process, utilizing a process 
of catalytic cracking to convert heavy hydrocarbons into higher added value, lower molecular weight 
compounds under hydrogen pressure (Billon and Bigeard 2001). Thereby this technology increases the 
value of refinery output through a conversion of lower value petroleum products, such as lubrication 
oils, into higher value products, such as jet fuel. While this is a mature technology originally developed 
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in 1927 to hydrogenate coal distillates, the continued application of the technology in modern refineries 
ensures that the technology is continuously developed. 
The hydrocracking technology has evolved over time in terms of innovation output, in Figure 1 we 
present the patents applied per year and the accumulated number of patents applied in the industry. In 
the graph showing the patent applied annually, it is clear that the industry has had its ups and downs, 
peaking in 1983 and 1998, and with lowest volume of patent applications in 1979, 1992 and 2006. 
These fluctuations make the industry a good match to investigate environmental uncertainty.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
With expert aid, we identified three distinct technology areas within hydrocracking. Process 
technologies (which we name ‘A’) are primarily associated with how the process of hydrocracking is 
integrated into the overall refinery process, and therefore includes technologies concerning the flow of 
petroleum based liquids, including valves, pipes, and the associated controllers. Catalyst preparation 
(we name ‘B’) is concerned with the manufacturing process of the catalyst necessary for hydrocracking 
to take place. This includes both the manufacture of the carrier of the catalyst (the base to which the 
active component in the catalyst is applied) and the application of the active component onto the carrier 
in the manufacturing process. The area of feeds and products (we name ‘C’) is concerned with the 
chemical nature of the raw materials of the refineries (feeds), and the chemical reactions that change 
specific feeds into specific products. These three technology areas find application both alone and in 
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combination with each other1, where, for example, patents combining the development of the active 
component (C) with the manufacturing technology (B) are a common combination (BC). The table 
below shows how IPC classes refer to technology areas within hydrocracking. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
However, while the subclasses are generally related, as seen above, exceptions exist where a few 
specific IPC classes are mutually exclusive from the rest of the subclass. For instance, in the above 
table we exclude the IPC subclasses C10G-47/24-30 from C as these constitute a competing technology 
to hydrocracking, which utilizes an entirely different technology and cannot be compared to the 
hydrocracking process. 
Our patent sample within hydrocracking consists of 3,902 patents from 1977 to 2007 collected from the 
Derwent Innovation Index. We identified 26 firms with five or more patents in this period from the 
assignees of these patents, for which we have collected firm level data. This yields a data set of 2,416 
patents associated with these firms, with the remaining patents assigned to individuals, universities or 
firms with fewer than five hydrocracking patents. In order to obtain a measure of patent value, we 
linked our patent data to the OECD 2010 citations database (Webb, Dernis et al. 2005), which contains 
citation data for all WO and EPO patents. However, these data are not complete, as far from every 
patent is submitted to the WO or EPO. It is not uncommon that patents are submitted to a national 
patent office only, and not to the international patent offices. Patents not submitted to the WO and EPO 
are commonly patents of little or no commercial value or patents that are not important enough for the 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
1"A"combination"of"different"technology"areas"is"based"on"the"nature"of"the"innovation"and"the"technologies"utilized,"
not"on"the"patent"claim"itself."
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firm to have worldwide coverage. It is particularly firms in the US, Japan, and China that submit 
numerous patents to their national patent offices only. Therefore, when each patent family is counted 
only once, when only patents that are applied for by applicants with more than five patents in total are 
used, and when the patent families are linked to the OECD citations dataset, and the data is linked to 
the variables needed the result is a total of 934 patent families. The findings presented in this paper 
may therefore be biased towards firms with significant investments in the technology, in that they have 
five or more patents published by the WO/EPO.  
Dependent!variable!
PAT_VAL 
Our empirical study adopts a multidimensional conceptualization of patent value, inspired by Lanjouw 
and Schankerman (1999), that captures both technological importance and market value. Indeed, most 
of the measures available in the literature rely predominantly on either dimension (Gambardella, 
Harhoff et al. 2008; van Zeebroeck and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie 2011). Our dependent variable 
(Pat_Val) combines two measures: standardized technological importance (expressed by forward 
citations) and standardized geographical scope (expressed by family size). Patent value is therefore 
defined as:  
!"#_!"# = st !"#$%#&!!"#$#"%&' + st(!"#$%&!!"#$) 
Explanatory!variables!
1-RARITY OF INVENTION 
We develop a measure as a proxy for the rarity of a patent in the industry that considers both the 
technology area it refers to, and the extent to which it results from a recombination of technological 
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capabilities. With the help of an expert, we identified three broad technology areas that characterize the 
Hydrocracking technology: “process technology” (category A), “catalyst preparation” (category B), 
and “feeds and products” (category C). Table 1 shows the IPC codes defining each category. The IPC 
codes that describe a given patent may be associated to a single, a couple or all three technology 
categories. This allows us to propose a seven-fold classification of the technological areas of 
hydrocracking patents. We measure the non-rarity of a given patent as the ratio between the number of 
patents described by the same category as the focal patent registered up until the given year, and the 
total number of registered patents. Rarity is defined as one minus this ratio. 
1− !"!#$%! "!!"#$"%!&" = 1− !"#$%#!!"#$ , !!!"#$%#&!!"#$%!!"!!"#$%&'(, !! 
As we assume a curvilinear relationship between rarity and patent value, we include in our regression 
models also a squared term of this variable. 
UNCERTAINTY OF ENVIRONMENT 
We capture the uncertainty of the technological environment using the measure suggested by Luque 
(2002), and applied in a variety of studies, for example Park, Park and Lee (2012). This measure 
considers the annual variation rate of the patents generated in a given industry or relative to a given 
technology. In the formula: 
∆!!"! !!! !! !"#$!!"#(!!!)!"#!!"#(!!!)/! 
the term ∆!!"! !!! stands for the percentage change in industry i at time t and NP it is the number of 
patents assigned to industry i at time t. 
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As we assume a curvilinear relationship between environmental uncertainty and patent value, we 
include in our regression models also a squared term of this variable. 
LOW and HIGH UNCERTAINTY  
The variables Low_Uncertainty and High_Uncertainty are generated as dummy variables, taking 1 
when Uncertainty is respectively one standard deviation below and above mean.  
Control!variables!
We apply both firm specific and patent specific controls. At the firm level, control variables are 
included for firm size, operationalized as the number of employees, and the level of firm 
internationalization, operationalized as the number of branch locations. We gathered these data from 
ORBIS. These are included as our data cover both large fully-integrated oil firms and smaller firms 
with a narrower focus. We control for industry experience, as a measure for the size of the R&D 
departments by including the total number of hydrocracking patents applied. The degree of firm 
specialization is defined as the degree to which a firm has more patents within a single technology area 
or a combination of technology areas than the majority of the firm population in a given year. The 
majority of the population is defined as 90% of the firms, meaning that a firm needs to have a higher 
share of patents within a specific technology or technology combination than 90% of the population to 
be identified as a specialized firm. As the threshold is identified by the type of patent, it reflects the 
relative prevalence of the type. This variable changes over time, with some firms starting out as highly 
specialized but losing this label as they accumulate patents in different technology areas. The reverse 
also occurs, when a firm starts out with a broad patent portfolio, but switches to developing primarily a 
single technology or technology combination above all else. We also control for prior specific 
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experience accumulated in the specific patent type as share of the total accumulated number of hydro 
cracking patents in the firm in t-1.  
At the patent level, a number of control variables are included: the age variable is a count variable 
indicating the number of years since the patent was applied for. To control for patents receiving input 
from external scientific sources such as universities, a dummy variable measuring whether the focal 
patent cites non-patent related literature is included. We also control for the number of inventors as 
well as the number of assignees to ensure that the both the number of persons and firms behind the 
invention is controlled for. Other measures prior identified as being indicators of patent value at patent 
level is whether the patent is granted,  why a dummy variable taking 1 if granted is used, and whether 
the patent has been an opposed a dummy variable taking 1 if the patent has been opposed. 
STATISTICAL!METHOD!&!RESULTS!
Method!
 
In order to improve our understanding of the conditions under which capabilities are a source of 
competitive advantage and superior performance, we conducted a study aimed at assessing how the 
rarity of capabilities and the level of uncertainty affect the value of a technological invention. For this 
reason, the unit of analysis of our study is the individual invention, operationalized as a patent.  
The empirical analyses are conducted in three stages: first, we explore the relationship between patent 
value and technological rarity, then we consider also the effect of environmental uncertainty; finally, 
we explore the moderating effect of a low or high uncertainty environment on the relation between 
technological rarity and patent value. The dependent variable of these models (Pat_Val) is censored, 
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being the product of standardized forward citations and standardized family size, with values ranging 
between -1.989 and 15.115. Even though Tobit model is appropriate for censored data (Wooldridge 
2009), given the presence of only four observations at the lowest value, we rely on OLS estimations. 
The model can be written in the following way: 
!" !"#_!"# = !, !!,!,!!, ! ∗ !!"#/!!"! , !! ∗ !!"#/!!"!,!!!"#/!!"!,!! 
Where the probability of generating high value patents (PAT_VAL) depends on the ratio of rarity (! ) 
and rarity squared (!!), a ratio of uncertainty (! ) and uncertainty squared (!!), the dummy for low 
uncertainty (!!"#), the dummy for high uncertainty !!!"!, and the control variables denoted !. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2 and correlations in Table 3. In Table 2 it can be seen that 
the explanatory variable Rarity of inventions ranges from 0.03 to 1 and takes a mean of 0.465 with a 
standard deviation of 0.254, indicating that the data points are spread out over the range of possible 
outcomes. In Figure 1 the variance in hydrocracking patents over time was presented, showing peaks in 
1984 and 1999. This descriptive graph indicates an environment that changed over time. The 
uncertainty variable also reflects this: in the range from -1.259 to 2 the mean is 0.150 with a standard 
deviation of 0.542 indicating high variance. 
We present pairwise correlations in Table 3. It is interesting to notice the very low correlation (0.04) 
between the two patent value indicators Forward citations and Family size. This indicates that the two 
measures might, as expected, be expressions for different dimensions of value. We will perform a 
robustness analysis taking them individually into account, in order to verify the results from the 
measure we propose for patent value.     
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------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 & 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
4.2!Regression!results!
 
Table 4 shows our regression results. Model 1 is the baseline model including only the controls; in 
Model 2 and 3 examine separately the effects of Rarity and Uncertainty while Model 4 presents the 
fully specified model; finally, Model 5 and 6 consider the interaction between Rarity and, respectively, 
low and high Uncertainty. 
We start our analysis addressing Hypothesis 1 that the relationship between the value of an innovation 
and rarity is curvilinear and takes an U-shape. Model 4 shows that both the linear and the squared term 
of Rarity are significant, the former with negative sign and the latter with positive sign. This indicates a 
U-shaped relationship between the rarity and patent value, as graphically represented by Figure 2. This 
result is consistent with Model 2, considering the effect of Rarity alone. 
These results provide support to the expectations of Hypothesis 1, indicating that highly valuable 
inventions are those building either on rare or non-rare technological capabilities. 
Model 4 provides support also for Hypothesis 2 stating that the relationship between the value of an 
innovation and environmental uncertainty is curvilinear and takes an inverted U-shape, as the graphical 
representation in Figure 3 shows. Both the linear and the squared term of Uncertainty are significant, 
with respectively a positive and a negative sign. We find partial support for this result in Model 3, in 
which the quadratic term is slightly beyond the 10% significant threshold. 
This indicates that only a moderate level of technological dynamism is beneficial for the value of 
invention. 
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From these models we learn that the optimal environmental conditions for development of valuable 
inventions are a moderate uncertainty. Model 5 and 6 help our understanding of the drivers of value 
when uncertainty takes value outside this optimal area of uncertainty. While conditions of high 
uncertainty (Model 6) do not affect the relationship between rarity and patent value, we find statistical 
significant results for the moderating effect under low uncertainty (Model 5). Figure 4 shows 
graphically that the change in the relationship indicates a flattening of the curve, providing support to 
Hypothesis 3b, while Hypothesis 3a is not supported. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4, Figure 2, 3 and 4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
For what concerns the controls, the models consistently show that patents that rely on scientific 
knowledge, have multiple inventors and have been granted and opposed are associated with higher 
value. 
ROBUSTNESS!CHECKS!
In order to validate the reliability of our findings, we apply a Tobit regression to the models we tested 
using an OLS regression. The use of a Tobit is indicated as our dependent variable is censored; 
however, it presents only four observations at the lower limit. The results are presented in Table 5 (not 
considering the interaction between high uncertainty and Rarity). We applied to these results the tests 
indicated by Wiersema and Bowen (2009) and Bowen (2012) [results not presented here], finding that 
they and are consistent with the results of our principal model. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------ 
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Furthermore to address the issue associated to the use of a compound dependent variable, we run all 
models with both Forward citations and Family size as dependent variable individually. In Table 6 we 
present the results from negative binomial regression models (Models 12-16), where the dependent 
variable is number of forward citations, finding that the key explanatory variables maintain sign and 
significance.   
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
In Table 7 (Model 17 to 21) we also run all specifications utilizing only the count of Family_Size as 
dependent variable. Interesting the results is significantly different when analyzing the moderating 
effect in Model 20. While all controls’ results remain consistent with main results, the results for the 
interaction becomes insignificant, and the direction of the coefficients is opposite of the main results, 
and the results taking only Forward citations into account. This could indicate that be interpreted as 
during low uncertainty utilizing the family size measure as dependent variable is less reliable, as this 
indicator is a firm driven indicator. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Also tests concerning different specifications of specialized firms were conducted. In our main models 
we use a measure indicating whether the firm behind the invention is specialized in terms of its patent 
portfolio in comparison to other industry players. The majority of the population is defined as 90% of 
the firms. In robustness checks we use two other specifications of specialization, considering a 
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threshold at 75% and at the level of mean plus one standard deviation. Employing these specifications, 
the results remain unaffected. 
Conclusive!remarks!
In this study, we theorized and examined a central research question: under what conditions do rare and 
non-rare capabilities contribute to superior innovation value? This paper investigates the relationship 
between rarity of a capability and competitive advantage. The notion that unique resources provide a 
competitive advantage is one of the core concepts of the Resource Based View that recently has been 
subject to critical assessment by a handful of studies (Kor and Leblebici 2005; Teece 2007; Newbert 
2008; Drnevich and Kriauciunas 2011). We bring a contribution to this emerging stream of research by 
investigating the limits of rarity as a source of value for the firm.  
The analysis of the effect of rarity of the capability an invention builds on its value found evidence of 
positive returns of generating less rare innovations beyond a certain point, identifying the positive 
returns from generating non-rare innovations. This indicates that both capabilities that are idiosyncratic 
to a firm and those that are widely diffused in an industry lead to superior performance. These results 
provides empirical support to the core theoretical proposition of the Resource Based View that rarity of 
resources and capabilities permit firms to develop a competitive advantage – in this case, an 
innovation-based strategy – that ultimately drives to a superior performance. This result is in line with 
the findings of Newbert (2008). Furthermore, they help our understanding of the limits of rarity. While 
Drnevich and Kriauciunas (2011) find that rarity of capaibilites relative to the development of the 
current activities of a firm does not deliver a superior value, we find that non-rarity of a capability can 
be a driver of competitive advantage. 
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This paper has also shown that that an optimum level of uncertainty permits firms to build a 
competitive advantage based on innovation strategy, in accordance with the insights offered by 
(Ragatz, Handfield et al. 2002; Bingham, Eisenhardt et al. 2007; Bingham and Haleblian 2012). Our 
data shows that conditions of both low and high uncertainty dampen the value of an invention, as they 
do not provide adequate incentives to innovate. We argue that a moderate level of uncertainty leaves 
room to experimentation and to the introduction inventions that could fit – or even trigger – the 
evolution of the technological trajectory. Instead, we argue that in conditions of low uncertainty 
tendency to develop incremental improvements of an existing technology reduces the value of 
inventions, as does the tendency to imitate competitors’ strategy in conditions of high uncertainty. We 
believe that these results contribute to better specify the effect of uncertainty within the framework of 
the Resource Based View. These results are also relevant to the specialized stream of literature that 
investigates patent value (eg. Harhoff, Scherer et al. 2003; Gambardella, Harhoff et al. 2008), as they 
underscore the importance of including environmental factors in this analysis. 
We suggest that these results are important for the development of studies in management of 
innovation, as they help disentangling the factors underlying the generation of valuable inventions. The 
findings reported in this paper shed further light on how innovation value is affected by both the level 
of rarity of competence of a firm and level of uncertainty of technology. Importantly, we show that 
even in the case of a mature technology, innovation can be the outcome of different strategic pattern, 
characterized, in this case, by the development of either rare or non-rare capabilities. 
As all research, this study is not immune from limitations. First, our data permit us to observe only 
inventions that are patented: we are not able to observe the competences that have been deployed in 
projects that generated inventions that were not patented, such as those protected by trade secrets, or 
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that proved to be unsuccessful and did not lead to a patent. Relatedly, we are not able to observe to 
what extent competences developed in failure projects have subsequently underpinned successful 
inventions. Future studies could pursue a closer investigation of how environmental uncertainty and 
existing competence endowment of a firm impact on the trial-and-error process of invention, and how 
capabilities are transferred to related inventions. Second, our study focuses on the single invention, 
rather than on the clusters of inventions that typically give rise to an innovation. In other words, we 
look at the value of single patents, without considering complementarities with existing or future 
inventions. Future research could examine the nature of capabilities needed to exploit these 
complementarities. Such studies could analyze a firm’s product portfolios in combination with its 
patent portfolio. In this study, however, we addressed this effect by including for each firm the total 
number of patents within hydrocracking, and by measuring the firms’ degree of specialization at each 
point in time. With regard to our empirical measures, it should be noticed that our classification of 
technological capabilities relies on IPC codes. These codes are attributed to patents by examiners of 
patent offices, and thus they are prone to some degree of subjectivity. Although use of such codes is 
standard in patent studies, we validated and improved the measure discussing their use with both 
technical experts and patent experts with years of experience specific to this industry. Finally, we 
restrict our analysis to a single technology employed in a single industry; this raises the question of the 
generalizability of our findings, thus further research could address other technologies that are applied 
in different industries. 
Despites these limitations, we believe that this paper brings a worthwhile contribution to the academic 
debate on the resource based view and on management of innovation, and also offers important insights 
for firm management. Managers may be interested in our finding that non-rare capabilities – that 
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arguably require lower investments and shorter time to be deployed compared to firm-specific 
capabilities – may contribute to the value of an invention as much as a rare capabilities. Managers 
should also consider the external forces that affect the development of a technological trajectory, and in 
particular environmental uncertainty. We find that predictability of the environment lowers the 
expected value of innovation, requiring managers to assess more carefully investments to develop rare 
capabilities.  
 
 
" !
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TABLES!AND!FIGURES!
Figure 1 – Patent applications annually within hydrocracking and accumulated hydrocracking 
patents 
" "
Figure 2: Graphical plot of U-shape relationship between 1-rarity and patent value
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Figure 3: Graphical plot of Inverted U-shape relationship between uncertainty and patent value 
"
Figure 4: Graphical plot of inverted U-shape relationship between uncertainty and patent value, 
moderated by low uncertainty 
"
"
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Table 1 Hydrocracking technology areas and IPC classes2  
Technology area Associated IPC 
classes 
Excluded IPC 
classes 
Percentage of 
observations 
Process technologies 
(A) 
C10G-065/00  
B01J-008/00 
 
 
5% 
Catalyst preparation 
(B) 
B01J-021/00 to 
B01J-049/00 
B01J-023/76 
B01J-029/00 
21% 
Feeds and products 
(C) 
C10G-045/00 
C10G-047/00 
C10G-049/00 
C10G-045/44 
C10G-045/54 
C10G-045/58 
C10G-047/24-30 
8% 
AB                          
AC                         
BC                      
ABC 
Combinations of 
above classes 
 4%                         
13%                           
37%                      
11% 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics!
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Patent value .001 1.446 -1.988 151.154 
Forward citations 3.124 6.155 0 95 
Family size of patent 1.073 7.253 0 111 
1-Rarity of invention .465 .254 .029 1 
1-Rarity of invention (sq) .281 .238 .0008 1 
Uncertainty of environment .149 .541 -1.259 2 
Uncertainty of environment (sq) .315 .418 .0015 4 
Low uncertainty (dummy) .111 .314 0 1 
Non patent related citations (dummy) .085 .280 0 1 
Specialized firm .200 .400 0 1 
Experience  .546 .838 -16 1 
Internationalization 1.435 1.814 0 6.302 
Firm size 8.004 368.987 0 1.171 
Patents age 1.380 7.774 0 29 
Experience within the industry 6.620 6.511 1 246 
Patent grant .602 .489 0 1 
Patent opposition .009 .097 0 1 
Number of inventors on patent 4.585 4.326 1 74 
Number of assignees on patent 1.841 .954 1 10 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
2"IPC"classes"ending"in"/00"signify"that"all"nineHdigit"subclasses"within"the"sevenHdigit"class"are"included,"unless"
otherwise"noted."
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Table 3: Correlation matrix        
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 Patent value 1.00                   2 Forward citations 0.72 1.00                  
3 Family size of patent 0.72 0.04 1.00                 
4 1-Rarity of invention -0.02 0.09 -0.11 1.00                
5 1-Rarity of invention (sq) -0.00 0.11 -0.11 0.97 1.00               
6 Uncertainty of environment 0.08 0.12 -0.01 0.08 0.10 1.00              
7 Uncertainty of environment (sq) 0.01 0.13 -0.11 0.15 0.18 0.56 1.00             
8 Low uncertainty (dummy) -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.51 0.10 1.00            
9 Non patent related citations (dummy) 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.09 -0.12 -0.04 0.03 1.000           
10 Specialized firm 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 1.00          11 Experience -0.03 -0.10 0.05 -0.37 -0.40 -0.09 -0.32 -0.02 -0.07 -0.01 1.00         12 Internationalization 0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.08 0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.04 0.16 -0.05 1.00        13 Firm size 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.07 -0.25 -0.10 0.28 1.00       14 Patents age 0.12 0.31 -0.14 0.25 0.29 0.33 0.48 0.08 -0.05 -0.08 -0.21 0.05 0.04 1.00      
15 Experience within the industry -0.08 -0.17 0.05 -0.22 -0.22 -0.09 -0.18 -0.02 -0.03 -0.24 0.17 -0.36 0.01 -0.47 1.00     
16 Patent grant 0.32 0.18 0.28 0.03 0.03 0.18 0.17 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.10 0.42 -0.25 1.00    17 Patent opposition 0.10 0.01 0.13 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.08 1.00   
18 Number of inventors on patent 0.33 -0.00 0.48 -0.04 -0.06 -0.10 -0.16 -0.03 0.09 0.01 0.05 -0.08 0.00 -0.31 0.21 -0.02 0.04 1.00  
19 Number of assignees on patent 0.15 -0.06 0.27 -0.02 -0.04 -0.10 -0.19 -0.05 0.14 0.02 0.06 -0.05 0.17 -0.34 0.07 -0.04 0.05 0.30 1.00 
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Table 4 OLS regression, dependent variable is patent value 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
1-Rarity of invention 
 
-1.983*** 
 
-2.026*** -2.353*** -2.128*** 
  
[0.291] 
 
[0.293] [0.321] [0.711] 
1-Rarity of invention (sq) 1.778*** 
 
1.799*** 2.175*** 1.901** 
  
[0.379] 
 
[0.380] [0.390] [0.760] 
Uncertainty of environment 
 
0.186** 0.194** 
  
   
[0.071] [0.075] 
  Uncertainty of environment (sq) 
 
-0.231 -0.261* 
  
   
[0.144] [0.132] 
  1-Rarity of invention* 
Low uncertainty (dummy) 
   
2.868** 
 
     
[1.114] 
 1-Rarity of invention (sq)* 
Low uncertainty (dummy) 
   
-3.035*** 
 
     
[0.980] 
 Low uncertainty (dummy) 
   
-0.641** 
 
     
[0.245] 
 1-Rarity of invention* 
High uncertainty (dummy) 
    
0.640 
      
[2.189] 
1-Rarity of invention (sq)* 
High uncertainty (dummy) 
    
-0.587 
      
[1.921] 
High uncertainty (dummy) 
    
0.051 
      
[0.551] 
Non patent related  
citations (dummy) 0.229 0.284* 0.257 0.315* 0.302* 0.294* 
 
[0.160] [0.164] [0.164] [0.168] [0.168] [0.168] 
Specialized firm 0.063 0.056 0.066 0.059 0.050 0.043 
 
[0.104] [0.105] [0.102] [0.104] [0.105] [0.111] 
Experience -0.003 -0.022 -0.027 -0.052 -0.021 -0.028 
 
[0.083] [0.082] [0.081] [0.079] [0.082] [0.085] 
Internationalization 0.028 0.028 0.025 0.025 0.027 0.031 
 
[0.043] [0.043] [0.041] [0.041] [0.043] [0.042] 
Firm Size 0.022 0.020 0.022 0.019 0.018 0.019 
 
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] 
Patent Age 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.027** 0.027** 0.026*** 0.020** 
 
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.008] 
Experience within the industry -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Patent grant 0.794*** 0.782*** 0.778*** 0.763*** 0.789*** 0.784*** 
 
[0.066] [0.065] [0.069] [0.068] [0.064] [0.061] 
Patent opposition 0.895 0.939* 0.895* 0.939* 0.926* 0.941* 
 
[0.530] [0.528] [0.527] [0.524] [0.537] [0.530] 
Number of inventors on patent 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.118*** 
 
[0.028] [0.029] [0.028] [0.029] [0.029] [0.030] 
Number of Assignees on patent 0.128** 0.135** 0.122** 0.130** 0.135** 0.132** 
 
[0.061] [0.061] [0.059] [0.059] [0.059] [0.061] 
Constant -1.840*** -1.381*** -1.772*** -1.293*** -1.305*** -1.292*** 
 
[0.211] [0.223] [0.218] [0.230] [0.226] [0.219] 
R-squared 0.244 0.253 0.248 0.257 0.256 0.255 
Adj.R-squared .2347247 .2422059 .2368784 .2449886 .2427993 .2418396 
No of Obs 934 934 934 934 934 934 
F test 67.77946*** 156.9885*** 61.59315*** 153.5754*** 137.2706*** 169.3541*** 
 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 5 Tobit regression, dependent variable is patent value 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
1-Rarity of invention 
 
-1.996*** 
[0.270] 
-2.053*** 
[0.264] 
-2.350*** 
[0.310] 
1-Rarity of invention (sq) 
 
1.795*** 
[0.314] 
 
1.825*** 
[0.316] 
2.166*** 
[0.347] 
Uncertainty of environment 
  
0.213*** 
[0.075] 
0.223*** 
[0.078] 
 Uncertainty of environment 
(sq) 
  
-0.282* 
[0.146] 
-0.314** 
[0.130] 
     1-Rarity of invention*Low 
uncertainty (dummy) 
    
2.721** 
[1.061] 
     1-Rarity of invention (sq)*Low 
uncertainty (dummy) 
    
-2.822*** 
[0.969] 
     Low uncertainty (dummy) 
    
-0.654*** 
[0.252] 
     Non patent related citations 
(dummy) 
0.229 
[0.163] 
0.285* 
[0.164] 
0.262 
[0.164] 
0.321* 
[0.165] 
0.303* 
[0.167] 
Specialized firm 0.063 [0.093] 
0.055 
[0.098] 
0.067 
[0.092] 
0.060 
[0.099] 
0.050 
[0.099] 
Experience -0.004 [0.061] 
-0.022 
[0.062] 
-0.033 
[0.054] 
-0.058 
[0.054] 
-0.022 
[0.062] 
Internationalization 0.029 [0.026] 
0.029 
[0.026] 
0.025 
[0.026] 
0.025 
[0.025] 
0.028 
[0.026] 
Firm size 0.021 [0.014] 
0.019 
[0.014] 
0.021 
[0.014] 
0.018 
[0.014] 
0.017 
[0.014] 
Patents age 0.026*** [0.007] 
0.026*** 
[0.007] 
0.028*** 
[0.008] 
0.029*** 
[0.008] 
0.027*** 
[0.007] 
Experience within the industry -0.000 [0.001] 
-0.001 
[0.001] 
-0.000 
[0.001] 
-0.001 
[0.001] 
-0.000 
[0.001] 
Patent grant 0.794*** [0.063] 
0.782*** 
[0.061] 
0.775*** 
[0.065] 
0.760*** 
[0.062] 
0.788*** 
[0.059] 
Patent opposition 0.894 0.939* 0.895* 0.939* 0.923* 
[0.546] [0.543] [0.539] [0.539] [0.534] 
Number of inventors on patent 0.117*** 
[0.023] 
0.118*** 
[0.024] 
0.117*** 
[0.023] 
0.118*** 
[0.023] 
0.118*** 
[0.024] 
Number of assignees on patent 0.132** 
[0.063] 
0.139** 
[0.062] 
0.126** 
[0.061] 
0.133** 
[0.060] 
0.139** 
[0.061] 
Constant -1.852*** [0.139] 
-1.391*** 
[0.148] 
-1.774*** 
[0.153] 
-1.289*** 
[0.161] 
-1.314*** 
[0.154] 
sigma 
Constant 
     1.262*** 
[0.011] 
1.255*** 
[0.011] 
1.258*** 
[0.010] 
1.251*** 
[0.010] 
1.252*** 
[0.011] 
No of Obs 934 934 934 934 934 
Uncensored o~s 930 930 930 930 930 
Log likelyhood -1.543.876 -1538.26 -1.540.763 -1.534.642 -1536.28 
Pseudo R-squ~d .0782187 .0815721 .0800777 .0837321 .0827542 
F test 439.7257*** 399.1957*** 362.471*** 279.8561*** 460.9796*** 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
     
#
Table 6 Negative Binomial regression, dependent variable is Forward Citations 
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 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
      1-Rarity of invention 
 
-2.058*** 
[0.334]  
-2.017*** 
[0.331] 
-2.744*** 
[0.357]    1-Rarity of invention (sq) 
 
2.029*** 
[0.408]  
1.913*** 
[0.414] 
2.825*** 
[0.430]    Uncertainty of environment 
  
0.198**
[0.101] 
0.201** 
[0.099]      Uncertainty of environment (sq)   -0.408*** [0.131] 
-0.418*** 
[0.126] 
 
   1-Rarity of invention*Low 
uncertainty (dummy) 
    5.603***
[1.967] 
    1-Rarity of invention (sq)*Low 
uncertainty (dummy) 
    -6.596*** 
[1.979] 
    Low uncertainty (dummy)     -0.835** [0.416] 
    Constant -0.582* -0.124 -0.531* -0.061 -0.036 
 [0.315] [0.334] [0.309] [0.326] [0.322] lnalpha 
     Constant 0.132** 0.111 0.120* 0.098 0.092
 [0.067] [0.070] [0.070] [0.074] [0.070]       Pseudo LL -1.962.886 -1.957.758 -1.958.934 -1.953.643 -1.952.594
No of Obs 934 934 934 934 934 
Wald-Chi2 642.6914*** 1336.384*** 793.2447*** 1913.349*** 2094.292*** 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
#
Table 7 Negative Binomial regression, dependent variable is Family Size 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
      1-Rarity of invention 
 
-0.551*** 
[0.168]  
-0.574*** 
[0.168] 
-0.501*** 
[0.181]    1-Rarity of invention (sq) 
 
0.308* 
[0.162]  
0.322* 
[0.166] 
0.224 
[0.172]    Uncertainty of environment 
  
0.083**
[0.035] 
0.089*** 
[0.031]      Uncertainty of environment (sq)   -0.106* [0.059] 
-0.124** 
[0.058] 
 
   1-Rarity of invention*Low 
uncertainty (dummy) 
    -0.425
[0.464] 
    1-Rarity of invention (sq)*Low 
uncertainty (dummy) 
    0.688 
[0.471] 
    Low uncertainty (dummy)     -0.033 [0.471] 
    Constant 1.798*** 1.972*** 1.826*** 2.011*** 1.971*** 
 [0.087] [0.092] [0.084] [0.087] [0.089] lnalpha 
     Constant -2.334*** -2.371*** -2.348*** -2.387*** -2.376***
 [0.353] [0.361] [0.353] [0.361] [0.361]       Pseudo LL -2.672.592 -2.662.187 -2.669.193 -2.657.988 -2.660.929
No of Obs 934 934 934 934 934 
Wald-Chi2 2122.063*** 3003.254*** 2369.501*** 2908.646*** 3645.035*** 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
#
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